The "Wittgen=steine" series (organized by the Wittgenstein Research Group) features two talks this term:

• January 17th, 2025, 3:00pm to 4:30pm, HS 2i:
  Oskari Kuusela, "Grammar and truth"

January 17th, 2025, 3:00pm to 4:30pm, HS 2i:
Oskari Kuusela, "Grammar and truth"

Abstract: 

Wittgenstein’s rejection of philosophical theses in both his early and later work has posed a problem for the reception of his philosophy. Having been largely ignored in connection with the Tractatus until Diamond’s seminal papers in the late 1980’s, and thereafter variously treated and mistreated, the story is similar in the case of Wittgenstein’s later work. Arguably, the logical role of grammatical statements, as construed, for example, by Peter Hacker and his followers is essentially that of philosophical theses, except that Hackerian so-called grammatical truths claim acceptability by all users of relevant expressions. To describe such Hackerian theses as undeniable super-theses would not be an exaggeration in contrast to Wittgenstein’s own claim to pull back any statements not agreed upon by his interlocutors. Another interpretational tendency has been to treat grammatical statements as merely pragmatically useful, rather than truth-apt (in the style of Carnap). In my talk I address this set of issues, arguing that whilst grammatical statements are indeed truth-apt, they are not representations of truths unlike theses. Instead grammatical statements, whose logical role is that of a model employed as an object of comparison, constitute instruments for comprehending what is true, whereby truth may be more complex than what a grammatical statement or model represents it as being. To my knowledge this is a novel position in the history of philosophy dominated by theses regarded as exclusively true representations of truth. (If I have time, I conclude by comparing Wittgenstein with Heidegger on truth.)